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VIEWPOINT: KAUTILYA
Taking Stock Of Stocks Understanding the reasons why India's foodgrain stocks
are now mounting
By Jairam Ramesh India's granaries are overflowing. The safe
level of buffer stock of foodgrains (that is, rice and wheat) is
about 24 million tonnes as of July 1 every year. Pre-1999, stock
levels were not abnormal. But foodgrain stocks were about 34 million
tonnes on July 1, 1999, around 43 million tonnes on July 1, 2000 and
approximately 62 million tonnes on July 1, 2001. Almost half of the
foodgrain stocks are held in Punjab, one-fifth in Haryana, one-tenth
in Uttar Pradesh and about 6 per cent in Andhra Pradesh. And what
about their vintage? A 1999 World Bank report placed half the stock
as being at least two years old and another 30 per cent being two to
four years old.
In the 1970s, procurement of foodgrains by
the Food Corporation of India (FCI) averaged about 10 million tonnes
annually. In the 1980s, it averaged around 18 million tonnes per
year. Between 1990-91 and 1998-99, procurement averaged about 23-24
million tonnes annually. But in the past two years procurement has
zoomed: 31 million tonnes in 1999-2000 and 36 million tonnes in
2000-1.
Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Haryana account for over 80 per
cent of rice procurement. Andhra Pradesh's performance has been
particularly striking: a half of the rice output is being procured
now as compared to just one thirds five years back. Punjab, Haryana
and Uttar Pradesh account for 90 per cent of the wheat procurement.
Procurement is Punjab's lifeline; here, over half of the wheat and
three-fourths of the rice output is purchased by the FCI. The
Central government pushes the procured foodgrains through the Public
Distribution System (PDS), a network of about 4.6 lakh ration shops
across the country. On an average, in the 1970s about 11 million
tonnes and in the 1980s around 16 million tonnes were pushed through
the PDS annually. Thus, the balance between procurement and PDS
supply was more or less maintained. This balance continued pretty
much in the 1990s also. But in 2000-1, PDS supply fell sharply to
11.7 million tonnes.
Thus, foodgrain stocks are overflowing
because procurement has increased very sharply and the supply to the
PDS has plummeted. The increase in procurement clearly has had a far
greater impact. This raises further questions. Why has procurement
skyrocketed and why is the PDS selling vastly lower quantities of
foodgrains?
The NDA allies in Andhra Pradesh, Punjab
and Haryana are pressurising the Vajpayee regime to procure more
foodgrains and to relax quality norms. The 1990s has also seen very
liberal increases in the minimum support price (MSP) taking them
higher than in the 1980s and what would be justified on
considerations of inflation. For instance, the Commission on
Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) had recommended an MSP of Rs
465 per quintal of paddy in the 1999-2000 crop year. But the actual
price was Rs 490 a quintal. For wheat, as against the CACP
recommendation of Rs 490 a quintal, the actual procurement was at Rs
550 a quintal. Such a support price policy has also priced Indian
rice and wheat out of international markets.
On PDS, the H.D. Deve Gowda government in
February 1997 introduced the Targeted PDS (TPDS) that distinguishes
two categories of consumers to be identified by the states: below
poverty line (BPL) and above poverty line (APL). This was done to
introduce a pro-poor bias into a PDS that had hitherto been
universal in coverage and had been benefitting mainly the better-off
peninsular India and West Bengal. In the TPDS, Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar have received significantly higher allocations of foodgrain as
they must. But the BPL/APL distinction has proved to be unworkable,
specially since it is the same retail outlet that sells to both
categories. In any case, dual pricing always leads to leakages. The
Vajpayee Government worsened the situation by introducing new
schemes and by increasing APL prices to a level where they are now
higher than even the market prices. As a result, PDS consumers are
now buying better quality foodgrain from the market.
A massive food-for-work programme is
certainly needed in the ecologically vulnerable regions to provide
both employment guarantee and food security. But this will absorb at
most five million tonnes of foodgrains. The problem of mounting
stocks can be addressed only when we muster up the courage to (i)
diversify Punjab's agriculture out of the wheat-paddy cycle; (ii)
introduce a more realistic MSP policy; (iii) reform the entire
foodgrain marketing system presently built around a high-cost and
inefficient FCI; (iv) remove policy-induced inefficiencies in
private-sector storage, milling, marketing and transport operations;
and (v) simplify the PDS by doing away with dual pricing but keeping
the pro-poor state bias in allocations. If this is not done, we will
continue to confront a crisis of plenty while our mindset is still
tuned to managing a crisis of shortages.
(The author is with the Congress party.
These are his personal views.)
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