RIGHT TO FOOD: BUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY

Summary Note

The Supreme Court appointed Dr. N C Saxena and Mr S R Shankaran as commissioners covering various food and employment related schemes.  The note was made after deliberations in a meeting held at Indian Social Institute, Delhi on Aug 9, 2002 regarding building measures of monitoring and building accountability.

1. In interim orders dated 8 May 2002 and 2 May 2003, respectively, the Supreme Court appointed Dr. N.C. Saxena and Mr. S.R. Sankaran as �Commissioners� for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of all orders relating to the right to food (PUCL vs Union of India and others, Writ Petition 196 of 2001). The Commissioners are empowered to enquire about any violations of these orders and to demand redressal, with the full authority of the Supreme Court. They are also expected to report to the court from time to time. 

2. The appointment of the Commissioners is an important opportunity for the Right to Food campaign. Their intervention can be a great support for us in cases of violations of the orders, which are legion. Also, an effective �monitoring and redressal system� is essential for the entitlements defined by the Supreme Court (earlier as well in the future) to be a reality. 

3. To be effective, the Commissioners need to be assisted. It is proposed that in each major state, members of the Right to Food campaign will help the Commissioners to identify an �adviser� to assist them. The adviser will be assisted by a secretariat including at least one full-timer in every state. The state governments have also been requested to appoint a �nodal officer� to enable periodic interface with the Commissioners and the secretariat. The main role of the adviser will be: (a) to send the Commissioners regular updates about the situation in the state, (b) to convey to the Commissioners any appeal for intervention that may be made in the state, (c) to work towards a more effective monitoring and redressal system within the state. In addition, the adviser and the secretariat may assist in other functions of the Commissioners listed above. 

4. The main functions of the Commissioners can include the following: (a) an analysis of state performance using macro data; (b) rigorous participatory research; (c) response to emergencies; (d) ensuring the functioning of an effective micro-level grievance redressal system; (e) ensuring dissemination of information by the state governments; (f) articulating alternative demands regarding state policy especially on hunger; (g) preparing periodic state reports; (h) establishing a permanent monitoring mechanism for hunger-related issues; (i) ensuring accountability for failures of state functionaries.

5. Aside from reporting to the Supreme Court and seeking its intervention, various steps can be taken by the Commissioners to deal directly with violations of the orders. For instance: (a) they can write to the Chief Secretary or other authorities in the concerned state; (b) they can personally visit places where violations are reported, and seek a response from the authorities with the full authority of the Supreme Court; (c) they can draw attention to policy anomalies that undermine the right to food (e.g. the self-defeating PDS arrangements in most states).

6. The Commissioners will be acting mainly in response to appeals received from different states through the adviser. According to the Supreme Court, the intervention of the Commissioners is to be sought only after exhausting other redressal mechanisms (e.g. complaints to the District Collector), but this provision can be interpreted quite flexibly. The Commissioners are also empowered to act on their own initiative.  

7. When sending appeals to the Commissioners (through the adviser), campaign members will need to bear in mind that the Commissioners� time and resources are limited. There is no point in flooding the Commissioners with complaints that they are unable to deal with. Generally, it is better to seek their intervention in matters that will have wide �ripple effects� rather in nitty-gritty violations of the order. To illustrate: if there are complaints about the quality of food served to school children through the mid-day meal scheme, it is better to ask the Commissioners to seek a state-wide remedy to the problem rather than to intervene in specific schools. However, in some cases it is useful to pursue specific, local violations for the purpose of �demonstration effects�. For instance, in the event of a �starvation death� in a particular village, or of a wave of starvation in a particular area, the Commissioners could be invited to investigate.

8. We envisage the adviser as a person of high integrity and credibility, who can handle government authorities at high levels, and who is seen to be sufficiently �independent� of the campaign (and of the government) to perform this role objectively. In each state, we expect him or her to collaborate closely with a small team of members of the Right to Food campaign (as is already happening in Delhi with the Commissioners). The team will help the adviser to collect, organise and analyse information relating to the right to food; to send regular reports to the Commissioners; to make well-prepared appeals for intervention to the Commissioners from time to time, etc.

9. Please do not underestimate the importance of the �research� activities undertaken by the advisers and their secretariat/team. The information and insights generated by this process will be a vital resource for the whole campaign. An effort will be made to ensure some compatibility in the research methods across states, so that comparable information is generated for all states.

10. The Commissioner and adviser can encourage the formation of an institutionalised �forum� where high-level government authorities interact with citizens� groups on a regular basis. This can be particularly important at times of drought or other crises. 

11. Within each state, the adviser and his or her team are expected to work towards building an effective �monitoring and redressal system�. There is no blueprint here, and each team will need to explore the problem in the light of local circumstances, e.g. its equation with the state government and the credibility of panchayat institutions. One general principle is important: we are not seeking to create a �parallel� monitoring structure, independently of the government. Monitoring and redressal are ultimately the responsibility of the government and local government institutions. But we can play a role in proposing and promoting imaginative devices to ensure accountability and strengthen people�s entitlements. 

12. To illustrate: we can insist on the principle of �retrospective compensation�, i.e. that if someone has been deprived of his or her rights, he or she should be compensated with retrospective effect. This means that if (say) an Antyodaya household has been deprived of its food rations during the last six months, it should not just be enabled to obtain them in the future but also provided immediately with six months� rations. This principle would give people a strong incentive to seek redressal in cases where they have been cheated, and it would also keep the state government on its toes. 

13. Various legal provisions can be used to build up an effective monitoring and redressal system. For instance: (a) the Payment of Wages Act, which insists not only on payment of minimum wages but also on timely payment, retrospective compensation, etc.; (b) the central government�s �PDS Order� of 31 August 2001, which includes extensive provisions for greater accountability in the public distribution system; (c) �right to information� acts (including the provisions for penalties), where they exist; (d) �panchayati raj� acts.  

14. The gram sabha is another important institution that can be mobilised in the context of establishing the right to food. In principle, the gram sabhas have wide-ranging powers of monitoring and �auditing�, as spelt out in state legislation and also reiterated by the Supreme Court in its order of 8 May 2002. An active gram sabha can ensure a fair selection of participants in food-related programmes, identify violations of court orders, demand sanctions in the event of corruption, etc. It can also ensure wide dissemination of information relating to food entitlements, details of disbursements, etc.